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Let Slip the Dogs of War
The Use of Private Security
Contractors in Modern Warfare
Jon B. Mitchell
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) has
begun to privatize war by increasingly utilizing private
security contractors. The deployment of a private force with
little oversight creates an array of problems. While they
provide a professional and effective response to complex
situations if properly applied, the use of contractors is
accompanied by legal and cost efficiency consequences
in mismanaged situations. To mitigate these effects,
there may be a better way of employing contractors than
demonstrated by the current paradigm.
American private security personnel have been
in operation since the Revolutionary War but have
not been significantly applied until the Global War
on Terror. By definition, contractors are individuals
and firms that fulfill the requirements of a contract
either by making products or performing a service
for a set amount of pay.47 The DOD utilizes two
types of contractors: private contractors and private
security contractors (PSCs). Private contractors
hired by the DOD provide various services such as
food preparation, janitorial work, base construction,
weapons and systems maintenance, translators,
reconstruction projects, and laundry services. These
companies provide the logistical support while private
security contractors carry weapons and provide
security to the contract holders.
The War on Terror has revolutionized the use of
armed employees; while their primary application is
to provide security in hostile areas, situations have
arisen in which they have fought alongside the military
in warzones.48 With the U.S. government relying on
private contractors to perform essential duties, many
analysts suggest that in future wars and conflicts it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to effectively perform
operations exclusively with conventional military forces.
The legal issue of titles immediately arises when PSCs
are employed. While having the word “security” in
47
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their services denotes armed employees, PSCs are
still private and therefore do not fall under military
authority. This creates a problem for satisfying the
Geneva Conventions’ rules of war as they pertain
to POWs and war crimes because of the unclear
distinction between combatants and non-combatants.
According to the International Committee of the
Red Cross, a combatant is classified as an individual
that directly participates in combat situations on a
regular basis.49 While private security contractors
are technically restricted to providing security and
not conducting combat functions, there have been
instances where PSCs have fought alongside military
forces in firefights; this has included infantry and
armed helicopter support, which appears to qualify
as active combatant status. Despite legal ambiguities,
the DOD has utilized security contractors in Iraq on
an unprecedented scale.

Schwartz, Moshe. The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security
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Congress. CRS Report for Congress. 19 January 2010; 2.

Private security was introduced to the War on
Terror by Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq at the outset of the war.
Bremer paid $21.3 million for the security services
of Blackwater, which was the first private security
company in the country.50 Blackwater provided a 36man security detail, SUVs, canine teams, Little Bird
helicopters with aerial gunners, and heavy trucks for
Bremer.51 Various ex-military contractors hired from
South America and South Africa soon represented
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her nationalities in the war,52 and the amount of
these security employees rose steadily throughout the
conflict. According to an article written in 2007 for
The Guardian newspaper, “[t]he precise number of
mercenaries is unclear, but last year, a U.S. government
report identified 48,000 employees of private military/
security firms.”53 Though this number may seem high,
only 5 percent of the U.S. force in Iraq was comprised
of armed security contractors.54 Near the drawdown
phase of the war, expert Tom Bowman asserts that
15,000 individuals will conduct U.S. diplomatic
efforts in Baghdad with an additional estimated 5,000
private security forces employed for protection and
support. These contractors perform security with
armed helicopters, armored vehicles, and assault
rifles.55 With these numbers, it is clear that PSCs are a
small portion of total contractor forces present in Iraq,
though this 5 percent still includes over 11,000 armed
employees who do not fall under close supervision or
chain of command. This results in legal issues and
complications, with lack of accountability at the
forefront of policy concerns.
As a result, Dov Zakheim, a former top Pentagon
official, states that there are not nearly enough
government supervisors in Iraq to oversee the actions of
PSCs.56 In agreement with this, William Nash, a retired
Army general with expertise regarding the reconstruction
process, points out that the Pentagon has so many guns
for hire in Iraq that they cannot all be controlled.57 The
unsettling reality of the situation is that in addition to
lacking control and accountability, it is possible that
these dogs of war have grown too strong for their chains.
Private security companies such as Blackwater, DynCorp,
52
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and Triple Canopy have built private armies that “rival
or outgun many of the world’s national militaries.”58
Additionally, private security contractors
frequently participate in lobbying to gain favor and
contracts. From 1998-2004, private contracting
companies donated $214 million to political
campaigns and spent $1.9 billion on lobbying firms to
pursue their interests in government.59 These defense
companies are able to make an excessive amount of
money from the government and use it however they
please. Not only does the DOD have to feed the dogs
large amounts of money, but in order to keep them
behaving correctly, the government must punish them
when they misbehave. Unfortunately, discipline has
presented a major dilemma relating to private security
in Iraq.
Several troubling incidents have occurred at the
hands of private security contractors, with Blackwater
receiving the most attention from incident reports.
There are many instances of PSC misconduct, as
presented in chronological order; for example, when
an inebriated Blackwater contractor allegedly killed a
bodyguard of Iraq’s new Vice President in December
of 2006, the company sent him back to the States
before Iraqi police could apprehend him. He was
fired from the company, but no legal charges were
brought against him.60 In another case, a 71-yearold Australian professor was shot and killed in 2006
by a private contractor convoy.61 Blackwater snipers
shot three Iraqi security guards at the Iraqi Media
Network the following year, and while no charges
were officially levied, the Media Network deemed
Blackwater responsible following an investigation.
However, the blame fell on deaf ears as the U.S.
government concluded that they operated within
the use of force.62 In October of that same year,
security contractors from Erinys opened fire on a
taxi with automatic weapons, wounding two men
58
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and a woman.63 Yet Blackwater’s worst media storm
in Iraq came when some of its employees shot 17
Iraqis. While the guards claimed that the convoy was
threatened, a U.S. investigation concluded that this
was not the case.64
There have been hundreds of reported incidents
where private security contractors have fired their
weapons at the wrong target, yet few have been
brought up on charges.65 A Marine who served in
Iraq stated that he and his fellow soldiers periodically
witnessed PSCs open fire on vehicles and immediately
leave the scene without explanation or cause.66 These
shootings and abuses conducted by private security
contractors have helped fuel the insurgency. A senior
military officer said that incidents caused by security
contractors had the unsettling potential to turn the
population in an AO (area of operations) against the
military.67 Schwartz’s Congressional Research Services
Report offers three possible solutions for the issues
of excessive force: the DOD could prohibit armed
PSCs from operating in combat areas altogether,
restrict them to static site security, or limit American
and third country national security contractors to
site security and allow Iraqi security employees to
conduct security in combat zones.68 Implementing
one of these boundaries would certainly coincide
with military efforts to gain the support of the civilian
population.
Under the Posse Comitatus Act, the United
States government is not legally allowed to deploy
active duty soldiers on American soil under
peacetime conditions.69 However, exceptions such
as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, epidemics, and
other emergency situations allow DOD personnel
to work in conjunction with law enforcement to

restore order in unstable areas.70 Federal personnel
and relief are only allowed into the affected state if
the governor requests federal assistance. In this
regard, the Hurricane Katrina aftermath provided
an insight into the concept of using private security
contractors to conduct security in the wake of natural
disasters. Following the initial devastation of Katrina,
Blackwater immediately deployed 180 security
contractors, without authorization or request, to
the affected areas and set up security operations for
government officials and wealthy private citizens.71
Because the company’s employees were already
operating in Louisiana before federal relief even
arrived, the Department of Homeland Security
contracted them to continue security operations. The
company made $70 million in contracts for its services
in the Hurricane Katrina aftermath.72 Additional U.S.
private security companies along with an Israeli entity,
Instinctive Shooting International (ISI), were hired
to protect government buildings and private homes.
ISI even operated an armed checkpoint outside of
a wealthy citizen’s residence.73 Registered private
security companies in the state soared from 185 to
235 in the two weeks following the hurricane.74 The
primary issue with this application of contractors is
that some of the contractors were still deployed in
Iraq just two weeks before the hurricane.75 An expert
on the situation commented in an interview, telling of
a contractor in New Orleans who complained about
the situation, saying “there wasn’t enough action
down there.”76
Now that the government has successfully
incorporated PSCs into relief effort, the potential arises
that they may be used in future emergency situations
on U.S. soil. However, this invites the question that
if private security contractors can conduct aggressive
70
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security in Iraq under the U.S. total force, why should
they be allowed to transition to a homeland security
force during emergencies? Their answer is that they
see such crisis situations as business opportunities
rather than problems and conflicts, and the DOD
needs timely solutions to those same problems. This
realization has helped to privatize and commercialize
the Department of Defense.
This commercialization of the DOD seems to be
a convenient course of action, but it also means that
the government has perhaps become too dependent
on private companies. A large portion of regular
DOD duties has been increasingly commercialized,
as shown by statistics from 1996:

than it does for federal service contracts. The Chairman
of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
John Murtha, notes that there is an abundance of
contractors in Iraq, some of whom collect more pay
than the U.S. Secretary of Defense.81 The amount of
money poured into PSCs in Iraq is an impressive 17
percent of the total U.S. budget for the war.82

Nixon, Ron. “Government Pays More in Contracts, Study Finds.” Nytimes.com.
12 September 2011.

Krahmann, 129.

Yet sometimes this budget is taken advantage
of; war profiteering can easily occur in the absence
of sufficient oversight and accountability. In 2006,
Custer Battles was taken to court as the first civil
fraud case against a private contracting company.83
This PSC was charged with war profiteering to the
total amount of $50 million from the United States
government.84 Although private contractors cost a
significant amount of money, they are actually the
less expensive option in certain circumstances. The
strategic use of private security contractors can be
more efficient and appropriate in cases for which the
military is not well suited.
One viable strategy would be to use private
security contractors to resolve conflicts in Africa,
potentially enabling war-torn countries to develop
peacefully. A security specialist on Africa asserts that
private security companies could resolve all conflicts
on the continent with $750 million from the UN’s
budget.85 One researcher on this topic states that this
cost would be far cheaper and more effective than the
UN’s traditional use of conventional peacekeeping

During the span of a decade, government
spending on contractors increased dramatically
from $46 billion in 2000 to $113 billion in 2010.77
At the now-decommissioned Counterintelligence
Field Activity unit, private contractors conducted 70
percent of the intelligence process.78 This prolific use
of contractors to fill government roles is common
practice, as demonstrated in the Air Force’s reliance on
contractors to the point of inclusion into an extended
“Air Force family.”79 This dependency further extends
to other areas of the DOD, as private intelligence
contractors are routinely awarded 70 percent of
the national intelligence budget amounting to a
$42 billion / year industry.80 While this increased
commercialization of DOD duties effectively eases
the burden of governmental responsibility, it is not
done without repercussions.
The Project on Government Oversight conducted
a limited study which shows that it costs the
government more money to pay for private contracts 81
82
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forces.86 One such example is Executive Outcomes,
a PSC which quickly ended a protracted war by
training Sierra Leonean government soldiers and
jointly confronting the RUF, a brutal rebel opposition
army. With the aid of EO, government troops ousted
the RUF from the country in a mere nine days’ time.87
Along with providing a viable solution for the
African nations, PSCs are being used effectively in
conjunction with the military in America’s war on
drugs.88 Half of the $630 million of U.S. funding
for the anti-drug effort in Columbia is funneled
to DynCorp and other private corporations.89 In
addition to their strategic value, PSCs offer the
advantage of quicker preparation and deployment.
Security contracting companies present greater
flexibility and ease of use because they can be employed
and fired on an as-needed basis.90 This allows the
government to use swift, adaptive forces rather than
military or federal personnel, which logistically take
much longer to prepare.91 For example, a leading
expert provides the tactical readiness of Blackwater:
“at present, Blackwater has forces deployed in
nine countries and boasts a database of 21,000
additional troops at the ready, a fleet of more than
20 aircraft, including helicopter gun-ships, and the
world’s largest private military facility – a 7,000-acre
compound in North Carolina.”92 This expedient force
is more convenient than dispatching a larger military
detachment, which would take months to prepare and
transport. In addition, private security companies can
also be used as a force multiplier or supplement rather
than direct replacement for conventional forces.
According to Schwartz’s report for Congress,
private security contractors can assist the military by
performing basic security. 93 This would leave the
military forces unencumbered to conduct operations,
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

which would help prevent overlap of PSC and military
operations. Clearly, there must be a distinction
between PSC support and combat operations. Private
security contractors could potentially be utilized as
a support package for military operations if deemed
necessary. Support could manifest in several ways
such as providing logistical, security, and extremely
limited combat support or by utilizing local nationals
as contractors for the government, because of their
terrain and language skills which traditional U.S.
forces often lack.94
This increased use of private contractors to fight
in wars would also provide a cushion for U.S. civilians
because fewer citizens would be sent to war and a draft
would never be necessary as long as PSCs are available.
Finally, private contractors are not officially included
on the official casualty lists. A leading expert states that
in just the Iraq war, “more than 900 U.S. contractors
have been killed, with another 13,000 wounded.”95
These contractor casualties are not included in the
official numbers, which would otherwise further
tarnish public image. This supplementary strategy of
hiring PSCs to deal with world problems will likely
continue to increase over time as they become more
adaptive and efficient.
Private security contractors are professional and
expedient assets to the Department of Defense if used
properly. If employed in conjunction with military
forces, they would best be applied as a force multiplier
in an effective support function. Additionally, if
private security contractors are to be implemented
strategically and in lieu of military personnel, they
must remain under close supervision from the DOD
or State Department. Proper strategic application of
private security contractors could truly be the crucial
force multiplier needed to resolve conflicts in today’s
chaotic world.
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Economics and Third World Debt
A Look at How Debt is
Hazardous to Third World Countries
Mary A. Doyle
Third world debt is a serious concern in the world today,
the cause of which can be attributed to the debt crisis that
occurred in the 1970s when a rise in oil price induced
higher interest and lending rates. As a result, third world
countries incurred a significant amount of debt. Factors such as colonialism, illegitimate loans, mismanaged
lending, and subsidizing have stimulated the rise in debt.
Consequently, there has been a decrease in education,
policy reform, and health spending, resulting in poorer
health conditions and weaker economic performance. In
response, there are numerous organizations working to
alleviate, and eventually end, third world debt.
Poverty is a worldwide phenomenon that has
existed for thousands of years and affects a multitude
of people on a daily basis. There are numerous
factors - particularly debt - which induce poverty.
Underdeveloped countries have been found to have the
poorest economies and thus contain the highest poverty
and debt rates. By building a better understanding of the
contributing factors of debt and its effect on a country,
society could collectively work to end debt. The cause
of third world debt is a combination of several factors,
including the debt crisis of the 1970s, overspending,
illegitimate loans, and embezzlement. These in turn
cause poor economic performance, a decrease in
government spending for health and education, and
higher unemployment levels.
It was not until the 1970s that debt began to
significantly impact global society. During this time,
the United States government exceeded its budget,
resulting in the printing of more money to cover
the loss. Inflation occurred which led to a rise in oil
prices by oil producing countries. Oil producers had
also deposited their profits into western banks, which
stimulated a rise in interest rates within the banking
sector. This in turn forced banks to lend money to third
world countries that wanted to continue developing,
as well as meet the rising costs of oil production.
According to the Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC),
debt “often arose through reckless or self-interested

lending by the rich world.” Countries that profited
from the rise in oil prices disbursed loans to poor
countries as a means of accruing more revenue and
obtaining allies, regardless of the country’s political
stance. With the rise in “world interest rates, a global
recession, and low commodity prices,” the amount of
debts grew dramatically and the ratio between debt
and repayment became unevenly distributed.97
Additional facets of debt include colonialism,
illegitimate loans (also known as odious debt),
mismanaged lending, and subsidizing (corruption and
embezzlement of money by the rich). Odious debt
is defined by the Jubilee USA Network as “debt that
resulted from loans to an illegitimate or dictatorial
government that used the money to oppress the
people or for personal purposes.”98 This type of debt is
prevalent in countries like South Africa, Tanzania, and
Cuba. The practice of mismanaged lending transpires
when a country incurs a debt to another country, the
country in which the debt owed to is pardoned, and
the cycle repeats itself as the in-debt country continues
to seek loans. Subsidizing occurs when the political
elite in developing countries rise to power and deposit
money in foreign banks with certain regulations; this
in turn causes more money to be withdrawn from
developing countries. As a result, developing countries
are forced to reduce the process of economic reforms,
which leads to a weakened economic performance.
The consequence of subsidizing is a dramatic decrease
on the price of commodities, which creates a devalued
currency rate.
Third world countries have continued to
experience the negative impact of the 1970s’ debt
crisis. An expert on the matter notes, “debt has
impeded sustainable human development, security,
and political or economic stability.”99 Third world
96
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